After 15 years of negotiation, China finally entered the WTO in 2001 accepting terms that not only would it have rejected for much of the negotiating period, but which were also far more stringent than those previously negotiated by new developing country members. This is partly because the legal structure of the WTO provides developed country members with considerable leeway to impose conditions on prospective entrants.
China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the Doha Ministerial meeting of 2001 marked the end of nearly 15 year's of negotiation between the Chinese authorities, the WTO working party on China's accession, and the major developed state members of the WTO. At the onset, and for much of this period, the motivations of the Chinese negotiators were quite straightforward and logical -to defend domestic producers from international competition as far as possible, while assuring access to markets in the developed world for exporters. However, the deal that was finally signed by the Chinese is in some ways a mirror image of these motivations, in that it entails market opening that will threaten the interests of many domestic producers, while providing other states with considerable theoretical protection from a rise of Chinese imports. Indeed, far from entering as a "developing country", as some in China proclaimed, I suggest that the Chinese agreed to a set of conditions and concessions far in advance of those previously negotiated by new developing country members (and in some respects, more restrictive than those offered to some developed countries).
An explanation for this mis-match is partly found within the legal structure of the WTO itself, which provides developed country members with considerable leeway to impose conditions on prospective entrants. Rules outlining how prospective members can negotiate entrance are, to say the least, vague, and notwithstanding the multilateral character of the WTO as an organisation, proceed largely through bilateral negotiations which disproportionately empower the existing member states. But it also results from the changing motivation of China's globalising state bureaucrats 1 during the later years of negotiation. Whilst originally designed to protect domestic producers from market competition and the need to reform, the final agreement should be seen as an external tool to enforce marketisation and reform -in collaboration with international globalising elites wishing to lock China in to multilateral trade norms, and promote domestic political and economic change within China.
I suggest, then, that a study of China's WTO entry negotiations reveals a shift in what I call the "embedded socialist compromise" which dictates the relationship between domestic economic reform, and international institutional norms in Chinese polity. Under conditions of globalisation, this shift, and its consequences, can be best explained by considering how "disciplinary neoliberalism" 2 combines with changing political preferences of globalising elites to further blur the distinctions between the domestic and the international, and between politics and economics. As such, any attempt to understand China's negotiations for WTO entry necessarily entails analyses of both the international (IR/IPE) and domestic (area studies) contexts that combined to produce the details of the final accession protocol
Reforming China's "Embedded Socialist Compromise"
Throughout the reform period, the Chinese approach to internationalisation was characterised by a dualistic approach. Where domestic industries were already 1 Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995) pp. 135-136. established, they were protected from international competition, with foreign investment encouraged to upgrade existing expertise and the technological base. But, particularly after 1993, a relatively liberal strategy was deployed to encourage investment aimed at promoting exports -indeed, at WTO entry, some 60 per cent of all imports came into China tariff free in the form of components that were processed and subsequently reexported as finished goods 3 . In short, and quite sensibly, the government attempted to use those elements of the global economy that were beneficial to promoting growth (particularly export growth) and to resist those elements that were perceived as being detrimental to domestic national interests.
Communist Party rule since 1949 had created a system in which the interests of the industrial working class (particularly those workers permanently employed in state owned enterprises) and the peasantry occupied privileged positions in decision-making.
In reforming away from socialism, China's leaders have been careful to ensure that these key sectors have not suffered too greatly from the introduction of the market. For example, while the introduction of a more market oriented system in agriculture resulted in increased rural incomes, the market was purely a "domestic" one, in that imports were heavily restricted through the use of tariffs and other barriers to imports. The market was used where it was beneficial, but resisted where its impacts were feared. Reform, then, entailed a compromise between the embedded residual socialist system, and the ever-increasing importance of the norms of liberal internationalism. The extent of domestic interventionism was too extreme to fit with Ruggie's conception of an "embedded liberal compromise" 4 . However, the concept of an embedded domestic system coming to terms with the-and gradually reforming closer to those norms -does inform our understanding here. As such, we can think of the way in which China managed the relationship between domestic protectionism and gradually conforming to international neo-liberal norms as representing an "embedded socialist" compromise. the US was prepared to use whatever means necessary to promote its own national interests.
Notwithstanding the significance of nationalism, the largest area of concern, and the biggest source of domestic political opposition to entry, came from more pragmatic fears over the implications of entry for key sectors of the Chinese economy. Here we return to the concept of an "embedded socialist compromise". During the process of the transition from socialism, the government attempted, where possible, to provide palliatives for those who stood to lose most from the dismantling of the old system, while allowing a new more market oriented system to develop. In urban sectors, the palliative was largely provided by maintaining production in State Owned Enterprises through formerly the provision of grants through the planning system, and more latterly, through the extension of loans through the banking and financial system. In the countryside, the provision of subsidies for producers has also been more recently supplemented by the extension of loans through the financial system, particularly as many small scale township and village enterprises turned from being engines of economic growth to drains on the financial system in the late 1990s. Such is the extent of this politically motivated and directed lending that taken as a whole, "China's banking system is insolvent: its bad debts exceed its capital" 10 .
It is worth remembering here that at the turn of the century, the PRC had a potential workforce in excess of 700 million people, and if such debt is viewed as the price of We should also note here that there is no national welfare system in China. In the countryside, the de-socialisation of agriculture removed much of the access to health, education and welfare that had previously been provided through the collective. In the urban areas, where such welfare services had been provided through the work unit, the bankruptcy of state owned enterprises could result not only in the loss of jobs and income, but also threatened the provision of basic welfare 14 . 
Joining the Club: GATT/WTO (Re)Entry Requirements
The domestic "embedded socialist compromise" between protecting domestic producers whilst promoting exporters -to resist globalisation where it was perceived to be "damaging" and promote it where it was beneficial -was threatened by the search for WTO entry. And in the process of negotiation, until the late 1990s at least, this dualism informed much of the Chinese negotiators activity. The question of China's entry or re-entry was essentially solved by a fudge that resulted in China formally requesting resumption of membership, but being treated in practice as a new member. One of the then USTRO negotiators, Bill Abnett, notes, that it took two years of intense arguing and explanation before the Chinese would accept that they were a contracting member, and that the concept of a "China seat" was irrelevant. In the final protocol on "Accession Of The People's Republic Of China" in November 2001 which admitted China into the WTO, the preamble simply starts, "Recalling that China was an original contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947" 17 , A key element here was a special agreement that allowed the US to opt out of its commitments to offering full and reciprocal national treatment to China even if it was not satisfied by any agreed "accessions package" that allowed China's admission. In practice, this special agreement was unlikely to have anything other than symbolic importance, as reaching the stage of an "accessions package" was all but impossible without US agreement.
The second, more problematic, question of semantics was over China's position as a developing or a developed nation. The Chinese placed great emphasis on being classified as a developing nation, which they insisted meant that the criteria for membership in terms of domestic economic liberalisation would not be as extensive as those required of developed nations. In particular, they argued that as a developing nation China would be subject to the generalised system of preferences that essentially allows special consideration for exports from developing states. It would also allow China to retain some import restrictions (to protect agriculture and young industries) and to provide limited subsidies for exporters.
The Chinese authorities also believed that developing country status would give them a longer time scale to implement reforms after entry 18 . However, it is notable that since the WTO replaced the GATT in 1995, none of the new members have been allowed to use the transitional periods set out in the WTO Agreement that were granted to developing countries that were members of the GATT. In this instance at least, new "developing nations" under the WTO regime have less to gain than new developing country members of the GATT, and meant that the continued delays in China's entry negotiations beyond 1995 actually reduced some of the benefits of developing nation status. By May 1996, the Chinese authorities claimed that they had already reached the criteria for membership as a developing nation 19 . But in reality, no such criteria exist. Indeed, both the concept of developing nation and the criteria for joining the WTO are, to say the least, vague. As Jackson puts it in a rather understated manner, "the whole legal system is one of extraordinary ambiguity" 20 . Within the WTO constitution, there is a tight definition of "least developed country" which uses the definitions established by UNCTAD 21 . But while many of the WTOs regulations refer explicitly to the specific position of developing country members, the classification actually has no legal status under WTO provisions. As the WTO itself states:
"There are no WTO definitions of "developed" and "developing" countries.
Members announce for themselves whether they are "developed" or "developing"
countries. However, other members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries." 22
In providing a legal basis for the generalised system of preferences that extended preferential special treatment for developing countries, it was agreed that this must take the form of a waiver to the then GATT MFN clause. But as Jackson notes, "it was left to each industrial country to define what was a 'developing country'" and "a great deal of The negotiator also noted that the EU negotiator abrogated previously agreed concessions on opening the Chinese market to foreign retailers. The EU "gave up" access to dealerships for petrol stations:
"in a very confused effort to help Carrefour. "a red herring and largely irrelevant to the discussions", and that developed, developing or whatever, China should only be allowed to join "on a commercially meaningful basis" 29 .
In the final report on the activities of the Working Party on China's accession presented at Doha in November 2001 30 , it was simply noted that the working party members "recognized the importance of differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries". However:
"because of the significant size, rapid growth and transitional nature of the Chinese economy, a pragmatic approach should be taken" 31 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, there is no mention of the words "developing country" at all in the official accession document presented to the ministerial meeting on 10 November 32 .
After the formal decisions to accept China's membership was made at Doha, the official Chinese media emphasised the "victory" of Chinese negotiators in ensuring that China had entered as a developing country 33 . As we have seen, this self-designation carries no formal legal weight, and "pragmatism" prevailed irrespective of how the Chinese government sought to classify itself. Thus, for example, despite reported long protracted arguments over whether China would limit agricultural subsidies to 5 per cent (as a agreed not to block accession, has 21 items on its reserved list. 43 .
Domestic Politics and the WTO
An explanation for the emphasis within China on gaining developing country status can be found within the dynamics of domestic politics in the PRC. It is incorrect to talk in terms of "China" wanting to join the WTO. The reality is that while some of China's leaders have been keen to join, others have been more sceptical, and others downright hostile. This division of opinions is also reflected in the population at large. Despite a campaign to emphasise the benefits of WTO membership in the Chinese media, there is considerable scepticism -not least amongst that section of the population that perceives the international community as trying to pressure China to conform to "unfair" international standards in an attempt to at best manage (and at worst obstruct) China's reemergence as an international power. These sentiments were fired over the years of negotiations when the US and China came into confrontation over security issues -most notably when the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, and over the spy-plane dispute in the Autumn of 2001.
In this respect, the pro-membership leaders were forced to tread a difficult line between their assertions that they were standing up for China in a hostile international that what they have just signed up to will cause sever damage to the Chinese economy and Chinese society. Those emanating from organisations like the World Bank, the IMF, and Washington consensus economists also have a political mission -to prove that there will be huge benefits of free trade to China, and these benefits will also bring gains to the developed world. They are as much about selling an idea as anything else.
Opposition to Entry
The case for chasing WTO entry seems even stranger in light of the lessons of the Asian membership. Better, then, to accept the current set of criteria than face a possibly more stringent set of conditions in the future, and try to mobilise support against the power of the Quad.
Another explanation lies in the need to stabilise China's access to major markets in the west -and particularly the US. Although access to the US market was facilitated by the annual renewal of Most Favoured Nation Status, there was considerable unease in China over the lack of certainty. On one level, the size (and growth) of China's trade surplus with the US was used as an example of the dangers of engaging China by those whose economic interests are at stake (most notably, US toy and textile producers). On another, those who opposed China's human rights record, Tibetan independence supporters, critics of China's one-child policy, opponents of nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan, and critics of Chinese arms sales, call for political conditionalities to be placed on any economic deals with China. WTO entry, then, was seen as a means of depoliticising market access issues, and of providing access to multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms.
A cursory glance at China's direction of trade statistics do not give a real indication of the significance of markets in the developed world for Chinese exports due to the high percentage of exports to Hong Kong that are subsequently re-exported to a third 46 Renato Ruggiero "China and the World Trading System" Speech at Beijing University, 21 April 1997, with thanks to colleagues at Renmin University.
country 47 . If we factor in re-exports through Hong Kong, then roughly 26 per cent of all Chinese exports go to Japan, around the same to the US, and around 16 per cent to the European Union. In short, two-thirds of all exports go to three major markets. And since 1979, 450 anti-dumping cases have been brought against Chinese exports, mostly from the developed world 48 .
But to truly understand the importance of export markets for Chinese development, it is essential to consider the relationship between export growth and "domestic" growth.
China's desire to join the WTO peaked twice -once in 1989 and again at the end of the 1990s. At both times, the domestic Chinese economy was in deflation, leaving export growth as essentially the only means of generating growth, and in turn minimising the impact of deflation on unemployment. In 1989, this was fired by a real fear that the EU and NAFTA might become economic fortresses that developing countries outside the global trading organisation would be unable to penetrate. In the 1990s, continued export growth was seen as providing the breathing space required to tackle domestic inflation, and to close down the high proportion of loss-making state owned enterprises (SOEs).
In combination, these dynamics help explain why sections of the Chinese leadership felt Despite promoting a number of followers to key ministerial appointments, it is a mistake to consider the Premier Zhu as an all-powerful leader. Indeed, in many ways, he is more popular outside the Chinese political structure than he is within it. And to a large extent, it is the international community that represents Zhu's major political constituency of support in pushing for WTO entry. In addition to the specific concessions on tariffs, subsidies and so on, WTO membership entails a fundamental shift in the legal basis of the Chinese political economy. The National People's Congress is charged with the task of making China's domestic legislation WTO conforming, and it is many respects the Chinese legal structure that faces some of the most immediate tasks in the wake of WTO entry. In short, as Wang and win" future as a result of WTO entry noted that those who face the biggest risk are "rural farmers on marginal land…resulting in greater poverty" 65 . Those who can and will engage will benefit, but those who can't won't
The aggregate approach not only misses the significance of sectoral differences, but also of geographic differences. And in a China where the locus of economic decision-making often rests at the provincial level, this is a crucial determinant of responses to the impact of WTO reforms. In agriculture, the impact, according to the same World Bank predictions, is likely to "vary by province" -too true. Furthermore, "the export intensive coastal provinces will gain, while the inland provinces -which contain the bulk of grain production and capital-intensive SOEs -may not gain much or lose". 
